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WHOSE HIGHEST AND BEST?   
INCLUDING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
AND INDIVIDUAL LANDOWNERSHIP  
IN THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE STANDARD 
Brigid Sawyer+ 
In a bleak and fitting analysis of American culture, Chief Sitting Bull of the 
Hunkpapa Lakota tribe stated, “The love of possessions is a disease in 
[Americans]. . . .  They claim this mother of ours, the earth, for their own use, 
and fence their neighbor away . . . If America had been twice the size it is, there 
still would not have been enough.”1  While private possession of property is a 
well-accepted part of American culture, how we use that property is often a hotly 
contested issue.  Takings under eminent domain reveal an inherit conflict in 
American ideology.  What do we value more: land being used for its most 
economically productive purpose or the individual rights of those first (or 
currently) using the land?2  As this Comment illustrates, this conflict is hardly 
limited to eminent domain and extends to other areas of land use and acquisition.  
The earth has a finite amount of space to accommodate the estimated 7.74 billion 
people in existence today.3  The answer to this question has important 
implications for the ability of people to use their land as they want and as the 
greater society needs. 
This Comment explores the American history of the two competing goals of 
land use: economic development and individual land ownership.  The 
similarities between founding-era philosophy on property, Native American 
land takings, and eminent domain valuation are not readily apparent.  Many 
Native American land cases, and the legislation surrounding Native American 
                                                 
 + J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, expected May 2021; B.A., 
Salve Regina University, 2016.  The creation of this Comment would not be possible without expert 
guidance and support of Professor Lucia A. Silecchia, for whom the author is extremely grateful.  
She also thanks the Catholic University Law Review staff and editors for their tireless and detailed 
work.  Finally, she thanks her family and friends for their unwavering love and support. 
 1. Sitting Bull, WIKIQUOTE, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Sitting_Bull (last visited Jan. 30, 
2021). 
 2. It is relevant to note that there are some land uses which do not solely provide an economic 
use or an individual benefit—for example, roads, school, hospitals, prisons, and railroads provide 
public benefits.  These public benefits often give an economic or an individual benefit as well, such 
as the creation of paths for commerce or the private ownership of public resources.  It is the purpose 
of this Comment to balance the goals of economic productivity of land with individual land 
ownership when those goals arise as justification for the choices made regarding land. 
 3. The estimated world population grows in number every day and has likely grown 
significantly since the publication of this article.  See U.S. and World Population Clock, UNITED 
STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/?# (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
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land, are not related to eminent domain.4  However, the theories and justification 
surrounding Native America land takings speak to the tension between the desire 
to use land in the most economically productive manner and the desire to respect 
the individual landowner’s rights, both of which are echoed in founding-era 
philosophy and eminent domain discussion. 
Section I details the founding philosophies that have shaped American 
understanding of land use.  Section II explores the history of Native Americans’ 
land rights and takings.  Section III discusses eminent domain, valuation in 
connection with eminent domain, and the impact of Kelo v. City of New London.5  
By analyzing these three seemingly different areas of law together, a more 
appropriate definition of highest and best use can be created.  Section IV points 
to the connections between these subjects and Section V recommends 
restructuring the highest and best use standard.  Redefining this legal term of art 
can create a standard that values both economic development and individual 
property ownership. 
I.  FOUNDING ERA PHILOSOPHY ON PROPERTY LAW 
In order to create a workable standard, the historical perspective on property 
ownership must be reviewed.  The desires for economic development and 
individual land ownership date back long before the United States was formed.  
Scholars discuss the tension between these and similar ideas that influenced the 
Foundering Fathers.6  However, four philosophers and writers—John Locke, 
William Blackstone, Adam Smith, and James Madison—had a significant 
impact on the Founders’ political philosophies.7  These four individuals come 
from the English common law system, Scottish economics, and American 
                                                 
 4. See infra Section II. 
 5. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 6. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 820–21 (1995) (discussing the differences in the 
conception of property between liberalism, which promotes individual rights above all else, and 
republicanism, which believes in limiting individual rights for the sake of the common interest). 
 7. David Adler, Legal History, Civic Literacy and a Liberal Arts Education: Building Blocks 
for Civic Participation, 56 THE ADVOCATE 42, 43 (2013) (commenting on Locke’s influence on 
the colonies and America in “preserv[ing] republican principles”); Schick v. United States, 195 
U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (discussing the fact that Blackstone’s ideas were well known by the Founders); 
James W. Ely Jr., The Constitution and Economic Liberty, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 34 
(2012) (noting that Smith was known by Founders but his work was not discussed at the 
Constitutional Convention or ratifying debates, making his influence “hard to chart”); Andrew 
Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 
1877 (2009) (“Smith had a substantial impact on the thinking of the Framers of the Constitution . . 
. .”); Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 
270 (1997) (“Mr. Madison was the prime mover in the drafting and adoption of the Constitution.  
He was the quintessential Founder, known for generations by the title ‘Father of the 
Constitution.’”). 
2021] Whose Highest and Best? 291 
philosophy.8  The first, John Locke, theorized that property ownership came 
from people mixing the labor they own with the land given to them in common.9  
Locke stated, “God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e., 
improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was 
his own, his labour.”10  Labor, owned by each person individually, improved the 
raw land and gave people ownership of the land which they improved.11 
Another English writer, William Blackstone, defined property as, “that sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe.”12  He praised the concept of individualized property in land, stating 
“[h]ad not therefore a separate property in lands, as well as movables, been 
vested in some individuals, the world must have continued a forest, and men 
have been mere animals of prey[.]”13  A Scottish economist, Adam Smith, 
theorized that, in the progression toward property acquisition, society passes 
through four different states: hunters, shepherds, agriculture, and commerce.14  
As society passes through each stage, the property is more susceptible to theft 
or harm and more laws need to be passed to protect property.15 
James Madison wrote a short essay on property, which began by defining the 
term with a quote similar to Blackstone’s definition: “that dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of 
every other individual.”16  Madison explained that property extends beyond 
property of physical things to individual rights.17  He was also one of the 
Federalist Papers’ authors.18  In Federalist 10, Madison cited unequal property 
                                                 
 8. William Uzgalis, John Locke, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2018) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/; Sir William Blackstone, Relief Portrait, ARCHITECT OF 
THE CAPITOL, https://www.aoc.gov/art/relief-portrait-plaques-lawgivers/sir-william-blackstone 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021); About Adam Smith, ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, 
https://www.adamsmith.org/about-adam-smith (last visited Jan. 30, 2021); James Madison, THE 
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/james-madison/ 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 9. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18 (Richard H. Cox, ed. 1982). 
 10. Id. at 21. 
 11. Id. 
 12. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND APPLICABLE 
TO REAL PROPERTY 1 (Alexander Leith & James Frederick Smith, eds. 1880), 
https://archive.org/details/commentariesonl00leitgoog. 
 13. Id. at 7–8. 
 14. Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, in CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND 
PROPERTY 120, 120 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000). 
 15. Id. at 122. 
 16. James Madison, Property, in CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 185, 
185 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000) (quoting The National Gazette (March 29, 1792)).  Madison did 
not quote Blackstone in his work.  Id. at 185–87. 
 17. Id. at 185. 
 18. Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).  The Federalist Papers were a 
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distribution as a main source of American factions.19  He stated, “Those who 
hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in 
society.”20  However, he believed the large size of the country would prevent a 
majority from organizing to take rights from another group of citizens.21 
The combination of these views shows the philosophical climate prior to and 
during the creation of the United States, as well as the theories that influenced 
the American legal system for years to come.  Locke was one of the only English 
writers to influence eminent domain law with his writings22 and courts cite 
Locke to ground their analysis of historical views of property rights and 
protection against the government.23  Courts also regularly cite to Blackstone’s 
definition and understanding of property.24  Further, since there was limited 
discussion of property and the Takings Clause at the Constitutional Convention, 
and Madison wrote the Takings Clause in the Constitution, his opinions are 
believed to have been of significant importance to the Founders.25 
                                                 
series of essays published under the pseudonym “Publius” arguing for the ratification of the 
Constitution.  Id. 
 19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Treanor, supra note 6, at 842; see also Jack 
N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245, 260 (1990) 
(summarizing Madison’s characterization of the causes of faction). 
 20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 21. Treanor, supra note 6, at 842–43. 
 22. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, 17 WASH. PRAC., REAL ESTATE § 9.1 (2d 
ed. 2020) (“[N]o [other] English writer attempted any systematic explanation of expropriation 
theory [English eminent domain]; and not a single English decision on eminent domain has been 
found from the pre-Revolutionary period.”). 
 23. See Kirby v. N.C. DOT, 786 S.E.2d 919, 924 (N.C. 2016) (citing Locke and Madison to 
support the statement, “From the very beginnings of our republic we have jealously guarded against 
the governmental taking of property.”); Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-
Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 204 (Tex. 2012) (showing that Locke’s statement on “preservation 
of property rights [being] ‘[t]he great and chief end’ of government” was previously approved by 
the Texas Supreme Court); Cannon v. State ex rel. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Transp., 807 A.2d 556, 
566–67 (Del. 2002) (Holland, J., dissenting) (“Undoubtedly influenced by Locke, the rights of 
property owners were characterized by the most prominent political theorists in the eighteenth 
century as the ‘bulwark of freedom from arbitrary govemment [sic].’”). 
 24. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Blackstone’s definition of property to create a historical background of Second Amendment rights); 
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 230, 237 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (citing to 
Blackstone to both define property and discuss the ability of the government to exact limits on 
private property); Kirby, 786 S.E.2d at 923–24 (citing to Blackstone to support the statement, “The 
fundamental right to property is as old as our state.”). 
 25. Treanor, supra note 6, at 791 (“There are apparently no records of discussion about the 
meaning of the [Takings] clause in either Congress or, after its proposal, in the states.  Madison’s 
statements thus provide unusually significant evidence about what the clause was originally 
understood to mean[.]”).  See also Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s 
Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 249 (2006).  In addition to the 
other philosophers mentioned in this Comment, Madison was strongly influenced by the ideas of 
Hugo de Groot (Grotius), who first paired the words “eminent domain” and articulated the idea that 
land could be taken by the government if remuneration of funds was given.  Id. at 245–46, 249–50. 
2021] Whose Highest and Best? 293 
II.  NATIVE AMERICAN LAND TAKINGS 
A.  Tension Between Founding-Era Theories and America’s Desire for Native 
American Land 
The idea that property is owned by those who use their skills and occupation 
to acquire it, alongside the protection that society and government afford,26 had 
to be balanced with the actions of European and, later, American settlers.27  In 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Supreme Court was faced with two conflicting lines of 
title, one tracing back to Native American ownership and the other acquired by 
the United States from Great Britain through the Revolutionary War.28  The 
defendants, who acquired their chain of title through the United States, argued 
against any property rights of indigenous people, citing Locke and other 
philosophers as the basis for this line of thought.29  In his majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Marshall agreed that the defendants had the true line of title but did not 
go as far as the defendants urged to deprive Native Americans of all land rights.30  
He stated, “[t]he absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by 
discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the 
discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.”31  In doing so, Marshall 
rode a fine line of acknowledging that, by occupying the land, the Native 
American tribes had a limited right to occupy it and the “discoverers” were the 
only authority to which the Native Americans could sell their land.32 
Marshall continued his theory of discovery with right to occupancy title in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia.33  Both cases dealt with 
Native American sovereignty and deciding whether state laws could be enforced 
against Native Americans.34  In Cherokee Nation, the Court refused to rule on 
whether the laws of Georgia could bind the Cherokee Nation but found that the 
Native American tribe was not a foreign nation within the meaning of the 
                                                 
 26. See supra Section I. 
 27. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 68 (2010) (“The Anglo-American 
account of the legitimacy of imperialism depended essentially on a vision of property that made it, 
as it was for Blackstone, the linchpin of social order, progress, and sovereignty.”). 
 28. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571 (1823). 
 29. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 1823 U.S. LEXIS 293, 32–33 (1823). 
 30. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 591.  Justice Marshall said this opinion is in line with the following, established 
principle: “[t]he absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery, subject only 
to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of 
acquiring.”  Id. at 592.  Occupancy is described as “full and exclusive possession, use, and 
enjoyment of the land described . . . .” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.03 
(Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012). 
 33. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 
Pet.) 515 (1832) superseded by statute as stated in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 
545, 562–63 (1983). 
 34. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 536. 
294 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70.2:1 
Constitution.35  In Worcester, the Court found that Georgia state laws which 
interfered with the relationship between the United States and the Cherokee 
Nation were “repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States.”36 
Eminent domain is the government’s power to take land for public use.37  
Formal exercise of this power is not often a point at issue in Native American 
land taking cases, since discovery, removal, and allotment38 provided sufficient 
justification for such land takings.39  However, in Cherokee Nation v. Southern 
Kansas Railway Co., the right to use eminent domain produced a chink in the 
armor of Marshall’s theory of discovery with right to occupancy.40  In this case, 
the Cherokee Nation argued that the United States could not use eminent domain 
to take land to build a railroad because the Nation was a sovereign state and held 
the right of eminent domain itself.41  Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, 
disagreed with the Nation’s position and, relying on Marshall’s opinion in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, said the Nation was a “dependent political 
communit[y],” and its separate status from the United States did not make it 
sovereign.42  He said that, even though the land was held in fee simple by the 
Nation (due to treaties between it and the United States government), the land 
was “held subject to the authority” of the United States.43 
B.  Legislative Response to Takings 
Early negotiations between the United States government and the Native 
American tribes were conducted through treaties and legislation.44  On May 28, 
1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, allowing the President to 
exchange land in the west “for the whole or any part or portion of the territory 
claimed and occupied by [a Native American] tribe or nation[.]”45  Treaties 
formed the basis of the United States’ removal process of Native Americans 
from their eastern homelands to the west.46  President Andrew Jackson, both 
before and after the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester decisions, put 
                                                 
 35. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 19–20. 
 36. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561–62. 
 37. Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  See infra Section III.A. 
 38. See infra Section II.B. 
 39. See generally Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal 
Perspective on Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 58–67 (2005) (comparing the current use of 
eminent domain with the taking of Native American lands through discovery, removal, allotment, 
and surplus lands given to white settlors). 
 40. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890). 
 41. Id. at 648–49. 
 42. Id. at 653–54. 
 43. Id. at 654, 656–57. 
 44. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.03 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017). 
 45. Indian Removal Act, ch. 71, 4 Stat. 411, § 2 (1830). 
 46. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 44. 
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pressure on Native Americans to enter into treaties that would give up their 
eastern land and require, either explicitly or implicitly, that they move 
westward.47 
As time went on, white settlors began moving westward, and removal policies 
were soon replaced with reservations—smaller areas of land for Native 
American tribes to live on—and allotment—assigning land to individual 
members of tribes.48  There was a belief that common ownership of property 
within Native American tribes was hampering development.49  Allotment was 
supposed to help assimilate Native Americans into American society.50  As 
Kenneth Bobroff described it, “[b]y instilling individualism in the wild Indian, 
allotment would bring to him the incentive to work and acquire.  With private 
property would come salvation and civilization.”51  The Indian Allotment Act 
was passed, which provided that “the President of the United States . . . is 
authorized, whenever in his opinion any reservation or any part thereof of such 
Indians is advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes . . . to allot the 
lands in said reservation in severalty to any Indian located thereon[.]”52  
However, this policy did not create Native American farmers; rather, it saddled 
Native Americans with property tax debt, fractioned heirs, and ultimately left 
room for white settlors to purchase or adversely possess the land.53  According 
to Bobroff, “[b]y 1934, when the Federal government ended allotment, the 
                                                 
 47. Id.  The United States’ treaties with the Cherokee Nation and the Creek Nation exemplify 
the interactions between the government and many Native American tribes during this period.  Id.  
The Cherokee Nation signed a treaty which required it to move west, and the journey subsequently 
became known as the “Trail of Tears.”  Id.  The Creek Nation signed a treaty giving it the option 
to create allotments of the land; but, after white settlors forcefully took it, the military forced the 
Creek Nation to move west.  Id. 
 48. Id.  Reservations were an important part of the recent Supreme Court case, McGirt v. 
Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).  The Court found that a Creek Nation reservation created by 
Congress remains “Indian nation” for the purposes of a statute assigning jurisdiction over crimes 
where the accused are Native American.  Id. at 2459–60, 2478, 2482.  This finding was based on 
Congress’ creation of the reservation without a subsequent termination of that reservation.  Id. at 
2482.  Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, stated that, because the reservation was promised 
to the Creek Nation perpetually, “[i]f Congress wishes to withdraw its promises, it must say so.”  
Id.  While this ruling is a step toward increased respect for the Creek Nation’s land, one ambassador 
for the Creek Nation stated, “[n]ot one inch of land changed hands today . . . All that happened was 
clarity was brought to potential prosecutions within Creek Nation.”  Jack Healy & Adam Liptak, 
Landmark Supreme Court Ruling Affirms Native American Rights in Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES (July 
9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/supreme-court-oklahoma-mcgirt-creek-
nation.html. 
 49. Leeds, supra note 39, at 65. 
 50. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of 
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2001). 
 51. Id. at 1571. 
 52. Indian Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, § 1 (1887). 
 53. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 1.04; Bobroff, supra note 50, at 1618. 
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policy had cost Indians almost 90 million acres, two-thirds of the land they 
owned fifty years earlier.”54 
Allotment ended with the passage of Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).55  By 
the 1930s, attitudes changed as to the assimilation of Native Americans into 
American culture, and a desire emerged to promote economic potential within 
Native American communities.56  On June 18, 1934, Congress passed the IRA, 
which provided “[t]hat hereafter no land of any Indian reservation . . . shall be 
allotted in severalty to any Indian.”57  The Act went on to state, “[t]he Secretary 
of the Interior, if he shall find it to be in the public interest, is hereby authorized 
to restore to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands of any Indian 
reservation heretofore opened . . . to sale, or any other form of disposal by 
Presidential proclamation[.]”58  A main purpose of this law was to promote 
economic development, which in turn would support Native American self-
governance.59  Pursuant to this Act, some land was taken in trust, meaning “that 
the federal government holds title to the land in trust for tribes or individual 
Indians.”60  But the impact was meek, even after the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
began attempting to acquire land for tribal owners.61  While the IRA decreased 
the rate at which Native Americans lost their land, it did not address allotment 
fractionation, and only a small amount of lands were returned to Native 
Americans.62 
                                                 
 54. Bobroff, supra note 50, at 1561. 
 55. Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard Law) Act, chs. 575–76, 48 Stat. 984 (1934). 
 56. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 1.05. 
 57. Indian Reorganization Act § 1. 
 58. Id. § 3. 
 59. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 
121, 144 (2006).  The IRA allowed tribes to adopt a constitution and bylaws to “organize 
themselves under the . . . Act.”  Indian Reorganization Act, Procedural Guide, 11 FED. PROC. 
FORMS § 41:89 (2020). 
 60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-543T, INDIAN ISSUES: OBSERVATIONS 
ON SOME UNIQUE FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ON TRIBAL LANDS 3 
(2011), https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125965.pdf.  Trust status frees the land from state and local 
taxes as well as zoning ordinances.  Id.  The GAO noted some uncertainty in the land in trust due 
to issues with the processing of applications by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and a 2009 Supreme 
Court decision.  Id. at 4.  In that case, the Court ruled that the language in the IRA—“now under 
federal jurisdiction”—which allowed the Secretary of the Interior to hold land in trust for Native 
Americans, meant “those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States when 
the IRA was enacted in 1934.”  Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009); see also Bethany C. 
Sullivan & Jennifer L. Turner, Enough is Enough: Ten Years of Carcieri v. Salazar, 40 PUB. LAND 
& RES. L. REV. 37 (2019) (analyzing the challenges and impacts of Carcieri). 
 61. G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 589 (2009). 
 62. Jered T. Davidson, Comment, This Land is Your Land, This Land is My Land? Why the 
Cobell Settlement Will Not Resolve Indian Land Fractionation, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 575, 586 
(2011).  The concern at the time was mostly focused on assimilating Native Americans into 
American culture.  Kelsey J. Waples, Extreme Rubber-Stamping: The Fee-to-Trust Process of the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 251, 261 (2012).  The Department of Interior 
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III.  HIGHEST AND BEST USE 
A.  Eminent Domain 
Beyond Native American land takings cases, eminent domain is another area 
of law that sees the tension between economic development and respect for 
individual land ownership.  Eminent domain is a right of a governing body, 
either under the natural law theory or the concept of sovereignty.63  The natural 
law theory says that eminent domain power in a constitution merely recognizes 
that a government has power under the natural law, and individuals subject to 
this power must be compensated for their land loss.64  The concept of 
sovereignty comes from the idea that eminent domain power lies with the 
sovereign, and positive laws must restrict that power.65  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court aptly stated, “[b]y force of this power, back of all private titles 
lies the eminent domain as an inherent attribute of organized government.”66  
The United States Constitution limits the federal government’s eminent domain 
powers with the following sentence: “[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”67  Each state in the country also has the 
power of eminent domain.68 
                                                 
acted on its own discretion to acquire lands in trust prior to 1980 and, even after a more official 
process was enacted in 1980, “scholars argued that the process was too similar to the pre-1980 
unpublished guidelines . . . .”  Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into Law, Policy, 
and History, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 527 (2013).  Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation 
Act (ILCA) in 1983 in an attempt to correct some of the problems of Native American land 
fractionation and to “[consolidate] tribal lands through sale, purchase, or other exchanges.”  
Davidson, supra note 62, at 587.  The ILCA, however, included a provision which forced land to 
escheat to the tribe when there was only a small, fractional share of property interest.  Leeds, supra 
note 39, at 68.  The Supreme Court found this action to be an unconstitutional taking, and Congress 
unsuccessfully attempted multiple revisions to the ILCA.  Id.  Congress also passed the American 
Indian Probate Reform Act (AIPRA) to reduce fractionation by changing the rules of intestate 
succession of heirs which has had some benefits reducing further fractionation but does not correct 
previous fractionation and sometimes dismisses tribal land choices.  Davidson, supra note 62, at 
591, 594. 
 63. 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.14(1)–(2) (Matthew Bender ed., 2020). 
 64. Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 43–44 (1847); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 1.14(1). 
 65. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (“The clause found in the Constitutions 
of the several States providing for just compensation for property taken is a mere limitation upon 
the exercise of the right.”).  The court in Boom Co. v. Patterson highlighted that the right of eminent 
domain is inherent to sovereignty.  Id.  Societies have historically varied in whether this includes a 
payment of just compensation.  See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 63, §§ 1.2, 1.14(3). 
 66. Weeks v. Grace, 80 N.E. 220, 220 (Mass. 1907). 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 68. See, e.g., Dalche v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 49 F.2d 374, 381 (E.D. La. 1931). 
298 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70.2:1 
B.  Valuing Land 
In order for there to be payment of just compensation, the land taken in an 
eminent domain proceeding must be valued.69  Land is valued by two factors: 
fair market value (or market value) and the land’s “highest and best use.”  The 
Mississippi Supreme Court described fair market value as, “the amount of 
money which could be obtained on the open market at a voluntary sale of 
property; the amount that a purchaser who is willing, but not required to buy, 
would pay, and the amount that a seller who is willing, but not required to sell, 
would accept.”70  It is the price of a free market transaction for goods or services: 
the lowest price the seller will sell at and the highest price the buyer will 
purchase at.71  However, fair market value is only one part of valuation because, 
unlike a typical transaction, an eminent domain case does not involve a willing 
seller.72 
The highest and best use standard is also applied in valuation.  In the same 
year that Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act, the Supreme Court 
decided Olson v. United States, where a landowner wanted the “actual use and 
special adaptability” of their land included in condemnation valuation.73  The 
Court stated, 
The highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable 
and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to 
be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full 
extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market 
value while the property is privately held.74 
                                                 
 69. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(2); see also Compensation, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “just compensation” as “a payment by the government for 
property it has taken under eminent domain—usu. the property’s fair market value, so that the 
owner is theoretically no worse off after the taking.”).  This proceeding is also called condemnation.  
Condemnation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 70. Tunica Cnty. v. Matthews, 926 So. 2d 209, 216 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Bear Creek Water 
Ass’n v. Town of Madison, 416 So. 2d 399, 402 (Miss. 1982)); see also United States v. 
Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123–25 (1950) (finding that some alternatives, such as 
ceiling prices, can be used when this fair market value is not an accurate measure of just 
compensation). 
 71. Law of Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 29, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/law-of-supply-demand.asp.  Valuation is determined as of 
the date of the taking.  United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984); AMTRAK v. 
Certain Temp. Easements Above the R.R. Right of Way in Providence, R.I., 357 F.3d 36, 39 (1st 
Cir. 2004).  Contra 1 JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 61 (1937) (stating that 
the “fair” in fair market value is sometimes used by courts to consider equity in eminent domain 
valuation and that the willing buyer and seller model is illusory because the actual market 
conditions are unknown). 
 72. D. BENJAMIN BARROS & ANNA P. HEMINGWAY, PROPERTY LAW 833 (2015). 
 73. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 248 (1934). 
 74. Id. at 255. 
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This was one of the first applications of the highest and best use standard.  A 
similar definition was also used for many years by the Appraisal Institute.75  The 
Appraisal Institute is a professional organization of real estate appraisers, and its 
members specialize in “valuation-related services.”76  However, in the 
fourteenth edition of the Appraisal Institute’s publication, The Appraisal of Real 
Estate, the definition was simplified to “[t]he reasonably probable use of 
property that results in the highest value.”77  The original elements of “(1) legal 
permissibility, (2) physical possibility, [and] (3) financial feasibility”78 are still 
considered, but the primary concerns are probability of use and the highest value 
of the land.79 
If a government wanted to purchase property for public use, and property 
owners were always willing to sell at fair market value, there would be no need 
for the government to use eminent domain.80  Courts have commented on this 
problem before, and the Seventh Circuit has stated that “[f]ull compensation will 
                                                 
 75. James D. Masterman, Proving Highest and Best Use, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 
MATERIALS: EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 89, 91 (2005). 
Highest and best use is the most profitable use the property will bring in light of its 
zoning, economic, environmental, legal, practical, social and physical characteristics 
unique to the property.  The four criteria that must be met are: (1) legal permissibility, 
(2) physical possibility, (3) financial feasibility, and (4) maximum profitability, 
sometimes phrased as maximum productivity. 
Id. 
 76. JOEL R. BRANDES, LAW & THE FAMILY NY FORMS § 97:1 (2d ed., 2020).  “The Appraisal 
Institute is a global membership association of professional real estate appraisers.  The majority of 
Appraisal Institute members are practicing real estate appraisers and property analysts who provide 
valuation-related services[.]”  Id.  See also ROBERT D. FEDER & P. BARTON DELACY, VALUING 
SPECIFIC ASSETS DIVORCE § 12.09 (2020); Masterman, supra note 75, at 92; About Us, APPRAISAL 
INSTITUTE, https://www.appraisalinstitute.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).  Other appraisal 
organizations and standards exist as well.  See generally WILLIAM S. YETKE & LARY B. COWART, 
VALUATION STRATEGIES DIVORCE § 6.61 (5th ed. 2020).  Additionally, the federal government 
and many states depend on the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), 
created by the Appraisal Foundation, for the basis of their real estate appraiser regulations.  7 
NICHOLS, supra note 63, §§ G4.03(1), (4)(b). 
 77. Mark D. Savin, Highest and Best Use and the Challenges of the Market, in ALI CLE 
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (2015) (quoting APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL 
ESTATE (2013)).  Under the USPAP, “an appraiser must ‘develop an opinion of the highest and 
best use of the real estate’ after analyzing the relevant legal, physical and economic factors.”  
Brandee L. Caswell, Anatomy of an Appraisal: How do Eminent Domain Lawyers Review and 
Analyze Appraisal Reports?, in ALI CLE COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (2020).  These factors 
include: “Legal permissibility[,] Physical possibility[,] Financial feasibility[,] Maximal 
productivity[,] Reasonable probability issues[,] Need for supporting expertise in HBU analysis[,] 
Proper application of Project Influence Rule in HBU determination[,] Alternative or multiple 
highest and best uses[, and] Interim uses[.]”  Id. 
 78. Masterman, supra note 75, at 91. 
 79. Savin, supra note 77; see also Michael Rikon, The Highest and Best Use Concept in 
Condemnation, 82 APR N.Y. STATE BAR J. 44 (2010). 
 80. BARROS & HEMINGWAY, supra note 72, at 833. 
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often exceed fair market value—many people would not sell their home for its 
fair market value, if only because of moving expenses.”81 
The Florida Constitution has a requirement of full compensation when the 
state government uses eminent domain82 and the Florida Supreme Court has 
ruled that moving expenses fall within the requirement for full compensation, 
saying that “[a] person who is put to expense through no desire or fault of his 
own can only be made whole when his reasonable expenses are included in the 
compensation.”83  By contrast, the Arkansas Constitution does not have a 
requirement of full compensation;84 however, the state’s Supreme Court has 
ruled that just compensation is defined by full compensation and that full 
compensation requires interest paid dating back to the time of the government’s 
entry, beyond the fair market value of the property.85 
C.  Kelo v. City of New London 
Eminent domain and the economic productivity of land came to a head in Kelo 
v. City of New London.86  In this case, the landowners contested whether the 
taking of the property for economic development constituted a valid public use 
and whether the property could be transferred to private owners “simply because 
the new owners may make more productive use of the property.”87  Of the 
landowners, one made “extensive improvements to her house” and another lived 
in her house since birth—the last sixty years of which were with her husband.88  
The properties, owned by these and other petitioners, were not of poor quality 
or upkeep; rather, they were condemned due to their location in the same area 
where the community development project was planned.89  The Court, citing 
precedent of allowing economic development as a public use, found that the 
economic development project was a public use.90  The Court pushed the 
ultimate responsibility for deciding public use to the states by saying, “[f]or 
                                                 
 81. United States v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2010); see 1 BONBRIGHT, supra 
note 71, at 72 (“The very value that I place upon my present dwelling is influenced by the fact that 
my ownership of it saves me from incurring these so-called ‘incidental losses.’”). 
 82. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a). 
 83. Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1958).  
At the time of this case, that constitutional provision was located in FLA. CONST. art. XVI § 29.  Id. 
at 290. 
 84. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22 (requiring only just compensation for property takings by the 
state of Arkansas). 
 85. Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Stupenti, 257 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Ark. 1953). 
 86. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 87. Id. at 496 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 472–73. 
 88. Id. at 475. 
 89. Id.  The majority opinion did not discuss the value these qualities added to the property.  
See generally id. at 472–90. 
 90. Id. at 480–83.  The Court cited to Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Hous. 
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), to 
illustrate economic development as a public use.  Id. at 480–82. 
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more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid 
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude 
in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”91  The 
Court also found that the transfer of land to a private party, even though it 
benefitted the new private owners, fell within public use because it was within 
“the government’s pursuit of a public purpose.”92  The Court concluded by 
saying that such results may seem harsh, even after just compensation payment; 
however, states had the option to impose stricter public use limits on 
themselves.93 
D.  Impact of Kelo 
In the aftermath of Kelo, many states heeded the recommendation of the 
majority and placed restrictions on their own eminent domain powers through 
legislation, ballot measures, and sometimes judicial decisions.94  Since 2006, 
forty-seven states have amended their eminent domain laws.95  There are many 
commonalities between these changes, but the most relevant for the purposes of 
this Comment are the narrowing of the public use definition and the increasing 
compensation for landowners in eminent domain cases.96  Kansas’s eminent 
domain statute provides an apt example of such a restriction, because it prohibits 
the government from transferring land to a private party except in certain 
enumerated circumstances.97  The statute allows eminent domain for economic 
development purposes, but caveats this broad exception with the following 
statement: “If the legislature authorizes eminent domain for private economic 
development purposes, the legislature shall consider requiring compensation of 
at least 200% of fair market value to property owners.”98  At the federal level, 
                                                 
 91. Id. at 483.  The Court applied the local legislature deference principle to the case at hand 
by stating, “[t]hose who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the 
Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a 
program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.”  Id. 
 92. Id. at 485. 
 93. Id. at 489. 
 94. 1 MICHAEL ALLEN WOLF, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN SPECIAL ALERT § SA.01 
(2019); 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN SPECIAL ALERT, § SA.02 
(2020). 
 95. WOLF, supra note 94; Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE 
L.J.F. 82, 86–88 (2015). 
 96. SACHMAN, supra note 94. 
 97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501b (2006). 
 98. § 26-501b(f).  Other states have similar provisions providing for additional compensation 
above fair market value.  For example, a homestead taking in Missouri is compensated for 125% 
of the fair market value.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.039(2) (West 2006).  Similarly, in Indiana, the 
taking of agricultural land entitles the owner to either 125% of the fair market value of the land or 
an ownership interest in other “agricultural land that is equal in acreage to the parcel” lost through 
eminent domain.  IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-8(a)(1)(A) (West 2019).  In Michigan, the taking 
of a principal residence must be given 125% of the fair market value of the property.  MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 213.23(5) (West 2007). 
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Congress attempted to create similar laws with broad prohibitions against 
takings for non-public uses, and allocated funding to revitalize areas with vacant, 
run-down, or foreclosed on buildings.99 
Even in the fifteen years since Kelo, little is known of whether eminent 
domain actions have increased or decreased due to the decision.100  In a report 
to Congress in 2006, the Government Accountability Office indicated that it had 
limited data on the impact of eminent domain due to its use by different state 
agencies and the fact that “it is difficult to establish measures to quantify the 
wide range of costs and benefits to individual communities of projects involving 
eminent domain.”101  One of the landowners’ attorneys in Kelo, Dana Berliner, 
wrote an article, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, where she analyzed Kelo’s 
effect had and state responses on eminent domain actions.102  She focused on 
New York, one of the three states that has not enacted significant restrictions on 
eminent domain, and noted that courts there have allowed eminent domain to be 
used for “private development around a sports stadium, the expansion of 
Columbia University, the replacement of a CVS with a Walgreens, and the 
enhancement of a golf course.”103  She also pointed out the inconsistency in state 
eminent domain laws since the Kelo decision.104 
State definitions of “blight” (endorsed by the Supreme Court in Berman v. 
Parker105) can be expansive, allowing eminent domain in areas considered 
“blighted” or in need of revitalization.106  Eminent domain cases based on blight 
are those “involv[ing] condemnation of land where the articulated public use is 
the removal of undesirable or unhealthy living conditions.”107  While legal 
challenges to blight takings have seen recent success due to courts that are more 
                                                 
 99. WOLF, supra note 94. 
 100. Meron Werkneh, Retaking Mecca: Healing Harlem Through Restorative Just 
Compensation, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225, 233 (2017). 
 101. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN: INFORMATION 
ABOUT ITS USES AND EFFECT ON PROPERTY OWNERS AND COMMUNITIES IS LIMITED 3, 5 (2006), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0728.pdf.  Congress mandated this study.  Id. at 2.  As of the date 
of this article, no follow-up report has been issued by this office to determine if there is more 
information in the years since the Kelo decision.  See https://www.gao.gov/index.html (search 
“eminent domain” and date restrict to 12/1/2006 through 09/07/2020). 
 102. Berliner, supra note 95, at 84. 
 103. Id. at 89.  Arkansas and Massachusetts are the other two states which have not changed 
their eminent domain laws.  Id. 
 104. Id. at 90. 
 105. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 n.13 (2005) (citing Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
 106. See Werkneh, supra note 100, at 238, 241–42; Patricia Hureston Lee, Shattering “Blight” 
and the Hidden Narratives that Condemn, 42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 29, 51–52 (2017); Leeds, 
supra note 39, at 55; Kaur v. N.Y. State Urb. Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 733–34 (N.Y. 2010) 
(finding that development of Columbia University’s campus in a blighted area was a public use). 
 107. Leeds, supra note 39, at 55. 
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critical of broad blight standards,108 litigation in these cases is often too 
expensive for those affected to dispute and challenges may be limited by 
states.109  Additionally, people of color and people in disadvantaged classes 
often have a greater likelihood of being impacted by a state’s definition of 
blight.110 
Wesley W. Horton, an attorney for the city in Kelo, also wrote a response to 
the decision entitled Kelo is Not Dred Scott.111  He cited Supreme Court 
precedent, arguing that economic development as public use was not a new 
development in eminent domain jurisprudence.112  He also pointed out that the 
courts are still available to landowners as a remedy if the government uses 
eminent domain improperly.113  J. Peter Byrne, a Professor at Georgetown 
University Law Center, argues that bias against minorities in economic 
development projects was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s but is no longer as 
significant of a problem, due to local control over such projects and growth in 
minority political power.114 
Immediately post-Kelo, alternative solutions to economic development as a 
public use became a popular topic for scholars, mostly focused on compensation 
for personal value.  John Fee suggested valuing homes based on their “intrinsic 
value” rather than simply market value.115  He argued that this position is 
consistent with the remedies available in tort law, such as emotional harm in 
wrongful death actions and sentimental damages for loss of personal property.116  
He recommended a graduated, statutory adjustment for “personal detachment” 
from the home based on length of time in the home.117 
Other alternatives include Kelianne Chamberlain’s suggestion to create a 
system where landowners impacted by eminent domain would receive a share 
of the revenue from the project their land was taken for, implemented either 
                                                 
 108. Dana Berliner et al., Challenging the Right-to-Take: A Whirlwind Tour of Cases and 
Issues, in ALI CLE COURSE MATERIALS (2015). 
 109. Lee, supra note 106, at 49; Berliner, supra note 108.  Berliner stated, “The past 10 years 
of redevelopment litigation indicates that courts now examine [blight definitions] much more 
carefully and with less deference then [sic] they once did.”  Berliner, supra note 108. 
 110. Leeds, supra note 39, at 56. 
 111. See generally Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo is Not Dred Scott, 48 
CONN. L. REV. 1405 (2016). 
 112. Id. at 1414–15. 
 113. Id. at 1425.  The authors go on to suggest a more developed version of Justice Kennedy’s 
test, looking more carefully at what constitutes a “public use.”  Id. at 1426–27. 
 114. J. Peter Byrne, Eminent Domain and Racial Discrimination: A Bogus Equation, in THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 51, 51 (2014), 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/FINAL_FY14_Eminent-Domain-Report.pdf. 
 115. John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 804 
(2006). 
 116. Id. at 805. 
 117. Id. at 818. 
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through statutes or judicial decisions.118  Similarly, Dale Orthner argued for a 
system based on the same premise with a “compensation premium” of fifty 
percent above market price, justified by the idea that landowners reap some of 
the rewards that the economic development plan would bring to the 
community.119  Professor Alberto Lopez suggested including a subjective harm 
calculation in the valuation of property under eminent domain.120  He argued 
that “the principle that just compensation is limited to the value of the soil lost 
by an owner ignores the human element inherent in the [eminent domain] clause 
and overlooks the historical foundations of eminent domain.”121  Under his 
theory, a subjective standard would allow for more just compensation for 
landowners affected by eminent domain.122 
IV.  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VERSUS INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In tracing the origins of economic development and individual property rights, 
it is important to begin with historical perspectives on these concepts.  Locke, 
Blackstone, Smith, and Madison all touched on the conflict between these ideas 
in their own unique ways.  They either pointed to the importance of individual 
property ownership or to the importance of government and society to manage 
these rights.123  Locke discussed the increased value of privately owned 
property, as opposed to that left in common, due to a person’s labor on the 
property.124  He went on to say that people enter into society, and the sovereign 
regulates their private property.125  Connecting these concepts, he argued, “[t]he 
great and chief end therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting 
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.”126 
Blackstone had a greater focus on the way that the creation of society 
impacted property ownership.  Blackstone stated that “the right of possession 
                                                 
 118. Kelianne Chamberlain, Comment, Unjust Compensation: Allowing a Revenue-Based 
Approach to Pipeline Takings, 14 WYO. L. REV. 77, 96, 101–02 (2014). 
 119. Dale Orthner, Perspective on Kelo v. City of New London: Toward a More “Just” 
Compensation in Eminent Domain, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 429, 457–58 (2007).  Another 
compensation definition would give five adjustments over fair market value, depending on specific 
circumstances of the land.  Shaun Hoting, The Kelo Revolution, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 65, 
122 (2009). 
 120. Lopez, supra note 25, at 299. 
 121. Id. at 294. 
 122. Id. at 292–93. 
 123. See supra Section I. 
 124. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 24.  “For the provisions serving to the support of human life, 
produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times 
more, than those which are yielded by an acre of land, of an equal richness, lying waste in 
common.”  Id. 
 125. Id. at 31.  Locke stated, “[f]or in governments the laws regulate the right of property, and 
the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.”  Id. 
 126. Id. at 75. 
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continued for the same time only that the act of possession lasted.”127  The 
combination of this insecure private property and limited land and resources 
created the need for society to protect private property.128  Society both provided 
a way to protect the property and to produce an economic order, which allowed 
people to use their property and the talents of their labor most productively.129  
Blackstone also believed in the ability of the state to take private property on the 
payment of a reasonable price.130 
Adam Smith theorized that people gain a greater sense of property as society 
passes through stages of development.131  Smith noted that occupation in these 
stages creates property, in that a person who spends time and energy acquiring 
something (in his example, an apple) enjoys title to that thing.132  While Smith 
approached property ownership from the perspective of the occupation society 
was in, as opposed to pure labor and need based acquisition, the similarities 
between his philosophy and that of Locke and Blackstone are abundantly 
clear.133 
In his essay on property, Madison stated that the government’s purpose is to 
secure property, regardless of whether it is a tangible thing or an intangible 
right.134  Madison believed that, even while property is at risk in the political 
process, the government that the Founders created had the instruments to protect 
it.135  Madison also argued that a government does not live up to its purpose 
                                                 
 127. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 3. 
 128. Id. at 7–8.  Blackstone also criticized the acquisition of property of other countries, stating: 
But how far the seizing on countries already peopled, and driving out and massacring the 
innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders in 
language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far such a conduct 
was consonant to nature, to reason, or to Christianity, deserved well to be considered by 
those who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing mankind. 
Id. at 7. 
 129. Id. at 8, 15. 
 130. Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.11, at 424–25 (4th ed. 1991)). 
 131. Smith, supra note 14, at 126.  See supra Section I. 
 132. Smith, supra note 14, at 122–23. 
 133. See supra Section I.  In her article tracing Smith’s influence through the United States 
judicial system, Robin Paul Malloy commented on the significant increase in judicial citations to 
Smith’s works since the 1970s.  Robin Paul Malloy, Adam Smith in the Courts of the United States, 
56 LOY. L. REV. 33, 61, 64 (2010).  She pointed out that Smith’s work was omitted from citations 
in many contemporary and controversial cases regarding private property rights, including Nollan 
v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469 (2005).  Id. at 59–60 n.105–08.  She explains this in the context of the fear of reviving Lochner-
era minimal regulations on private property.  Id. at 60.  She argued that “avoiding overt references 
to Smith may have been strategically prudent for those lawyers and jurists hoping to deregulate 
land use while seeking to promote the idea that self-interested property owners can best coordinate 
land controls through the convergence of private and public interest in the free marketplace.”  Id. 
 134. Madison, supra note 16, at 186. 
 135. Treanor, supra note 6, at 843. 
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when it neglects to protect an individual’s enjoyment of property or free choice 
in occupations, the latter of which is both property and the means to acquire 
property.136 
Economic productivity has been in competition with individual property 
rights throughout American history.  In comparing historical Native American 
land takings to contemporary post-Kelo land takings, Stacy Leeds pointed out 
that “[e]minent domain, and similar theories of land allocation, are rarely 
discussed when land resources are abundant.  But when competing interests eye 
a particular tract of land, a hierarchy of preferred land uses emerges.”137  While 
both goals are important, they are not always in harmony. 
In Native American land cases and laws, the conflict between individual rights 
and economic productivity of the land is evident, especially in Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinions.138  Marshall justified his theory of discovery by stating, in 
regard to Native Americans, that “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country 
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was 
drawn chiefly from the forest.  To leave them in possession of their country, was 
to leave the country a wilderness[.]”139  In his opinion, Marshall did not embrace 
the ideas of Locke and Smith overtly, since he did not agree that the Native 
Americans mixing their labor with their land gave them fee simple title to their 
lands, or that the occupation of hunting creates property rights.140  However, 
Marshall also did not explicitly deny Native American’s impact on title 
acquisition; rather than stripping them of all title, he gave a title of occupancy in 
their lands.141  He wanted to both respect the property rights of the Native 
                                                 
 136. Madison, supra note 16, at 186. 
 137. Leeds, supra note 39, at 77. 
 138. See supra Section II.A. 
 139. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823); see also Leeds, supra note 39, 
at 61 (“The Court’s action, though not an exercise of eminent domain, nonetheless constitutes a 
taking of a property interest.  By judicial action, the federal government took a property interest 
away from the original owner by simply declaring that the original owner never held absolute title 
in the first place.”). 
 140. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592; see also supra Section I. 
 141. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591.  Some courts have seen Marshall’s discussion of aboriginal title 
as a complete rejection of the idea that Native American lands were empty and available for 
European discovery and commercial use.  Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 
1097 (D.N.M. 2018).  But some scholars see Marshall’s argument as an attempt to reconcile the 
imperialist structure of America with the contemporary distain for it in politics.  PURDY, supra note 
27, at 71.  Purdy stated: 
If today’s scholars, lawyers, and legislators did not believe that property regimes should 
be judged by how well they promote economic efficiency and secure ordered political 
liberty, we would be at a loss to talk about them at all.  Marshall’s opinion rests 
substantially on values we still embrace, albeit in different programmatic versions, and 
to which we lack compelling alternatives. 
Id. at 86. 
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Americans,142 who occupied the land first, and justify the actions of the settlers, 
in part because they used the land in way that Americans viewed as more 
economically productive.143 
The way the Court discusses the discovery doctrine in relation to other Native 
American land cases is of great interest to this Comment.  In Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, Marshall justified the reason why Native Americans tribes did not 
constitute foreign states by saying, 
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their 
will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of 
possession ceases.  Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.  Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.144 
In this opinion, the interaction of the discovery theory from Johnson came 
into stark contrast with Locke, Smith, and Blackstone’s interpretations of 
property ownership.145  Marshall’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia emphasized 
the independence of the Native American tribes and the enforceability of the 
discovery doctrine only against other Europeans.146  Marshall said, 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, 
with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which 
excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate 
than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: 
and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on 
themselves, as well as on the Indians.147 
                                                 
 142. The manner in which Marshall discusses Native American property rights seems to hold 
more reverence for making the philosophical understanding of property ownership conform to the 
competing claims of title in this case than for the rights of Native American people themselves.  See 
supra Sections I, II.A.  The legal arguments he made were reflective of a desire to avoid losing 
American settlor’s use of land and their individual right to own property.  See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 
592. 
 143. See supra Section II. 
 144. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).  Justice Johnson, in his dissent, 
discussed the limitations of the treaties that the Cherokees entered into with the United States, 
saying, 
It is clear that it was intended to give them no other rights over the territory than what 
were needed by a race of hunters; and it is not easy to see how their advancement beyond 
that state of society could ever have been promoted, or, perhaps, permitted, consistently 
with the unquestioned rights of the states, or United States, over the territory within their 
limits. 
Id. at 23 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 145. See supra Section I. 
 146. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545 (1832). 
 147. Id. at 559. 
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Here, Marshall had to align the natural rights theory of property ownership 
with the discovery justification for the actions of European settlers.148 
In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., a case involving both 
Native American land and eminent domain, Justice Harlan addressed the 
assertion that the congressional act which gave authority to take Cherokee land 
to build a railroad might not be a legitimate exercise of eminent domain.149  
Harlan quickly dismissed this objection by pointing to the Commerce Clause 
and arguing that the United States has the power to regulate commerce among 
foreign nations, states, and Native American tribes.150  This is an important 
constitutional hook for Harlan’s argument, since the authorization of eminent 
domain to the federal government does not discuss relations with Native 
American tribes.151  By connecting the Takings Clause with the Commerce 
Clause, Harlan not only legitimizes land takings from Native Americans through 
eminent domain, but also creates a connection between an eminent domain 
taking and federal interest in commerce with Native American tribes.152  The 
arguments in this section of his opinion are very similar to contemporary 
arguments for a broad understanding of public use, contending that, even if the 
act of eminent domain gives a private benefit, it can be justified by the public 
benefit.153  Here, the public and commercial value of a railroad was prioritized 
over the private ownership of Native American lands, even though the railroad 
was a private corporation.154  While there was a public purpose to the use of the 
                                                 
 148. Marshall clearly struggles with this dichotomy in the text of this opinion.  At one point, 
he said, 
Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it, acquire 
for the several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom they were 
commissioned, a rightful property in the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful 
dominion over the numerous people who occupied it?  Or has nature, or the great Creator 
of all things, conferred these rights over hunters and fishermen, on agriculturists and 
manufacturers? 
Id. at 543.  A straightforward reading of the discovery theory would align with the former and a 
decision principled on Locke, Smith, and Blackstone would align with the latter.  However, 
Marshall refused to commit entirely to either principle. 
 149. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 657 (1890). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (“The Congress shall have Power 
to Lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defense and general Welfare of the United States . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]”). 
 152. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 657. 
 153. Id. at 657–58.  See generally Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 
99 (1960) (using the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to justify eminent domain held both by 
the United States and in fee simple by the tribe). 
 154. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 657.  Justice Harlan contended that, while “[i]t is true, that 
the company authorized to construct and maintain [the railroad] is a corporation created by the laws 
of a State . . . it is none the less a fit instrumentality to accomplish the public objects contemplated 
by the act of 1884.”  Id. 
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railroad, the Court ultimately had to make a decision between private ownership 
and economic development in the context of eminent domain. 
Congressional actions during the push for Native American removal and 
allocation also reflected a desire to encourage Native Americans to use their land 
in an economically productive way or to allow white settlers to acquire more 
Native American land.155  And, when Congress eventually took action to rectify 
the hardship its policies imposed on Native Americans, one of the justifications 
was reinvigorating the economies of the Native American tribes to promote their 
own self-governance.156 
In valuing land for eminent domain through judicial history and traditional 
appraisal practices, the economic potential of land is often prioritized.157  
Through fair market value and the highest and best use standard, we use 
indicators reflecting the current and future economic value of the land.158  Often 
citing back to Olson v. United States, courts sometimes refer to highest and best 
use as “the reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or improved 
property, which is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially 
feasible, and that results in the highest value.”159  Indeed, many factors are 
considered in this valuation, such as “market demand, economic development in 
the area, specific plans of businesses and individuals (including action already 
taken to develop the property for that purpose), and the use to which the property 
is devoted at the time of the taking.”160 
In Supreme Court cases, most notably in the Kelo decision, economic 
development as a public purpose has been accepted.161  Justices O’Connor and 
Thomas wrote impassioned dissents to Kelo.162  O’Connor argued that leaving 
the decision of what constitutes public use to state legislatures minimizes the 
                                                 
 155. See supra Section II.B.  Arguably, Native Americans at this time already used their land 
in what those in power would have considered an economically productive manner.  While the 
federal government argued that the Native Americans were unproductive because they did not 
acknowledge individual land property rights, many tribes did in fact have recognition of these 
rights—either in personal property or in land—mostly for agricultural tribes.  Bobroff, supra note 
50, at 1572–73.  This has been referred to as “allotment’s myth of common ownership.”  Leeds, 
supra note 39, at 64, 77. 
 156. See supra Section II.B. 
 157. See supra Section III.B. 
 158. See supra Section III.B. 
 159. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)). 
 160. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(8)(b). 
 161. See supra Section III.C. 
 162. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Of relevant note, Justice O’Connor concluded her 
dissent with a quote from James Madison’s essay on property, regarding the need for the 
government to secure individual property.  Id. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas 
similarly began his dissent with a quote from William Blackstone, concerning the preeminence of 
private property rights over public need.  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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importance of the constitutional provision for eminent domain.163  She 
advocated for a “judicial check on how the public use requirement is 
interpreted[.]”164  Moreover, she distinguished the Berman v. Parker and Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff decisions, on which the majority rested much of its 
argument for economic development as a public use, because those decisions 
eliminated a harmful use and conferred a public benefit.165  According to 
O’Connor, since the landowners’ properties were not “the source of any social 
harm[,]” there was no harmful use for the city to eliminate.166 
Thomas agreed with O’Connor that a public purpose determination by 
legislatures minimizes the impact of the Constitution’s public use clause, and 
then went on to argue that the majority’s public purpose theory is inconsistent 
with the text of the Constitution.167  He then pointed to the impact the case could 
have on economically strained communities.168  While acknowledging that 
compensation is paid to land owners, he contended that “no compensation is 
possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and 
the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes.”169  He also 
highlighted the ease of pushing this burden onto poor communities: “Those 
communities are not only systemically less likely to put their lands to the highest 
and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.”170  In these two 
short quotes, Thomas pointed to the problem of qualifying economic 
development as a public purpose, and the inherent inequities in creating a system 
which predominantly values land based on economic productivity.171 
Many states and Congress, seeing the potential to use this power unjustly, 
enacted restrictions to limit this power and increase compensation to land 
owners.172  While this response provides some restitution for the people affected 
by eminent domain, the inconsistency in state policies and problems with 
“blight” designations for eminent domain threaten individual land ownership in 
                                                 
 163. Id. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 480–83 (majority opinion), 500–01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Hawaii Hous. 
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (finding that the use of eminent domain for a private 
party to private party transfer did not confer a benefit on a private party, rather, it eliminated “evils 
of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii” which was deemed a public purpose); Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28, 32–34 (1954) (upholding a law allowing D.C. to take land considered 
“slums” through eminent domain for redevelopment, which could include selling or leasing the 
land to private parties, because the legislature has broad authority to determine its the public 
purpose). 
 166. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500–01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 167. See id. at 506–511 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 521. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See supra Sections III.C, III.D. 
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favor of furthering economic development.173  In Dana Berliner’s article, she 
stated that uneven regulations of constitutional rights do not adequately protect 
those rights.174  Some scholars posed alternative solutions to make just 
compensation more equitable for land owners.175  Those theories focused on the 
landowner’s enjoyment of development project profits, compensation based on 
length of home ownership, or a subjective standard for landowners.176 
V.  A BETTER DEFINITION OF HIGHEST AND BEST USE 
Suggestions to change just compensation standards are hardly a new concept.  
Immediately after the Kelo decision, many scholars gave recommendations to 
create new standards for either the public use or just compensation requirements 
of eminent domain.177  However, these suggestions often resulted in solutions 
that were inconsistent, highly standardized, or highly individualized to the point 
of being broad and nebulous.178  This Comment suggests a correction to just 
compensative valuation that is a more middle-of-the-road approach.  It is one 
that incorporates factors specific to landowners, while remaining broad enough 
to be adopted by both the states and the federal government. 
The highest and best use standard needs to be broadened to include factors 
that consider not only the highest and best economic use of the property, but the 
highest and best use that is personal to the individual.179  This specified 
assessment does not have to be as broad as Professor Lopez suggested in his 
article.180  Courts and legislatures often shy away from enacting standards of 
individual harm to compensation calculations, because it is harder to quantify, 
and they tend to favor uniform standards which give a percentage increase in 
compensation to homeowners or farmers.181  In his treatise on property value, 
James C. Bonbright acknowledges courts’ dislike of using sentimental value to 
the property owner in valuation, but contrasts this by pointing to courts that have 
offered owners compensation for destroyed property based on its “intrinsic 
value”—a value that seems to approximate the cost of recreating the property.182 
Some may argue that the specific economic conditions of a property are more 
easily quantifiable than the personal harm caused by the loss of the property; 
however, state and federal precedent show that expenses—such as moving 
expenses and interest on the land—can be incorporated into a compensation 
                                                 
 173. See supra Section III.D. 
 174. Berliner, supra note 95, at 90. 
 175. See supra Section III.D. 
 176. See supra Section III.D. 
 177. See supra Sections III.C, III.D. 
 178. See supra Sections III.C, III.D, IV. 
 179. See supra Sections III.B, III.D for a discussion of the highest and best use definition. 
 180. See Lopez, supra note 25, at 299. 
 181. See supra Section III.D; IV. 
 182. 1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 71, at 90–91. 
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calculation.183  These examples show the inclusion of more than fair market 
value or highest and best use calculations in valuation.  Additionally, land 
appraisers consider the individual economic circumstances of the land to value 
the property.184  They look at “market demand, economic development in the 
area, specific plans of businesses and individuals (including action already taken 
to develop the property for that purpose), and the use to which the property is 
devoted at the time of the taking[,]” to consider what the economic value of the 
property is.185  Indeed, Michael Rikon, in his essay The Highest and Best Use 
Concept in Condemnation, contended that “[h]ighest and best use is not a static 
concept, but one that fluctuates pursuant to changes in market value, land use 
regulations and available engineering techniques.”186 
The highest and best use definition can be re-written as a two-part definition: 
(1) “The reasonably probable use of property that results in the highest economic 
value[,]” and (2) the personal value to the property owner.187  In the same way 
that the economic standard of highest and best use has additional factors to 
consider in valuation of property,188 courts can incorporate similar factors to the 
personal value standard.  These could include: (1) length of time at the property, 
(2) non-economic relocation costs (such as distance from friends and relatives), 
(3) significant life events which occurred on the property, and (4) unique or 
irreplaceable modifications to the property (such as a family member who built 
a deck for the family to use on the property).  Length of time at the property can 
be valued similarly to the way the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) determines the 
marital property of the decedent’s estate for the spouse’s elective share—the 
amount a spouse can take from the estate in lieu of their share from the will—
which is a graduated percentage of the estate.189  It could be a percentage of the 
property value, a fixed amount for each additional year at the property, or a 
combination of both.  Further, life events and modifications to the property could 
be valued based on their likelihood of recreation (e.g., a wedding or a porch 
created by a deceased relative cannot be recreated) and the cumulative effect of 
regular events at a specific location.  Each of these events can be assigned a 
specific monetary value, which would be added to the final value.  These 
standards could form a basis for the unique conditions of the property to be 
valued against, since they are unlikely to be a one-to-one match with the property 
in question.  In addition to the economic standards, these standards could help 
form a more complete definition of highest and best use. 
                                                 
 183. See supra Section III.B. 
 184. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(8)(b); see supra Section III.B. 
 185. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(8)(b); see supra Section III.B. 
 186. Rikon, supra note 79, at 47. 
 187. Savin, supra note 77; see also 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(8)(b). 
 188. Masterman, supra note 75, at 91 (listing the criteria of “(1) legal permissibility, (2) 
physical possibility, [and] (3) financial feasibility”). 
 189. SUSAN N. GARY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS AND ESTATES 624 (3d ed. 2017). 
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In order to prove the value to the property owner, a landowner impact 
statement should be used in the analysis of the highest and best use.  This 
statement could be modeled after a combination of victim impact statements 
(VIS) and environmental impact statements (EIS).  In criminal cases, VIS can 
be used to give the sentencing judge or jury context of the harm the victim 
suffered as a result of the defendant’s action.190  In the context of a capital 
offense case, the Supreme Court commented on the use of victim impact 
statements by saying,  “just as the murderer should be considered as an 
individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique 
loss to society and in particular to his family.”191  Just as both the defendant and 
the victim should be considered in sentencing for criminal cases, so too should 
both the economic and personal value of land be considered in making a highest 
and best use determination.  An impact statement gives landowners a way to 
express the personal value of their land, which can be considered alongside the 
economic analysis.  However, there is a threat that the landowner will exaggerate 
the personal value of their property to unfairly make additional money from the 
government’s just compensation payment.  To counteract this, the EIS model 
should also be used. 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c), a government agency must create an EIS when 
their action “significantly affect[s] the quality of the human environment[.]”192  
While there are many purposes of an EIS, the Congressional goal is for the 
agency to consider the environmental ramifications of their actions—or a private 
party’s—while the proposal is still being formulated.193  Federal court standards 
for evaluating the adequacy of an EIS differ, but most look for whether it is 
sufficiently detailed and researched, proposes alternatives, and gives the public 
                                                 
 190. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 
 191. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 469, 517 (1991) (White, J., 
dissenting) overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 830).  Mitchell Frank criticized victim impact evidence, 
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Similarly, Amy Phillips points to the jury’s likelihood of taking the “worth” of the victim into 
account in sentencing in capital cases.  Amy K. Phillips, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The 
Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 105–06 
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and Speculative Alternatives, 25 J. LAND RES. & ENV’T. L. 287, 315–16 (2005); Michael C. Blumm 
& Keith Mosman, The Overlooked Role of the National Environmental Policy Act in Protecting the 
Western Environment: NEPA in the Ninth Circuit, 2 WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 193, 195 (2012). 
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information about the environmental impact of the project.194  Within the context 
of the highest and best use standard, the governmental body that proposes the 
condemnation could work with the landowner to create the landowner impact 
statement.  This creates a distilled explanation of the landowner’s personal 
value. 
The landowner impact statement should have elements that are similar to both 
a VIS and an EIS.  It should contain a description of the personal value of the 
land to the landowner, provided by that person, and the information should be 
verified by the landowner with documents on relatives in the description, birth 
and death certificates, building permits, and other pieces of evidence which 
corroborate their story.  While proof of an exact story might not be obtainable, 
people and their locations or events can be identified to substantiate the personal 
value description.  The governmental body will have the ability to review the 
description and evidence, as well as the ability to only include in the final 
landowner impact statement the parts of the description that can be substantiated.  
In implementing landowner impact statements, the legal profession will need to 
rely on appraisal associations for guidance as to the kind of evidence that could 
help substantiate a landowner’s personal value claim. 
As “highest and best use” is a term of art used by courts and appraisers, both 
would need to adopt the modified definition.  A lack of simultaneous agreement 
from both groups could create problems and lead to compensation appraisals and 
court rulings that are not in line with the new definition.  For this reason, even 
though highest and best use is not defined in statutes relating to condemnation, 
Congress should enact a statute modifying the definition.  This will allow courts 
and appraisers to change their standards as a response to Congress.  Further, it 
will follow many of the similar changes states have made to their condemnation 
laws, could encourage the holdout states to modify their eminent domain laws, 
and could even become a standard for states to look to when revisiting changes 
to their eminent domain laws. 
Implementing this standard will have significant impact on the practice of 
appraisers.  Congress will need to work with appraisal associations to ensure this 
new standard will be uniform and avoid complicated transaction costs.  Congress 
should inquire into the time added to appraisals and cases, costs of procuring 
documentation, and education for lawyers and appraisers on the new standard.  
This standard is balanced in that it compensates landowners for personal loss, 
while requiring them to prove that the loss; however, it will still require large 
changes in the existing system which necessitates cooperation and insight from 
all involved. 
                                                 
 194. See Mississippi River Basin All. v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2000) (listing 
ESI criteria within the Fifth Circuit); Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 
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for which it was designated.”); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 279–80 (W.D. Wash. 1972) 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The revised definition of highest and best allows for the competing values of 
economic potential and individual rights to the property to be analyzed together 
without placing one superior to the other.  Superiority of economic use was one 
driving motivation behind taking Native American land and allowing economic 
development to become a public use under eminent domain.  With the new 
definition of highest and best use, we can allow economic development to be a 
factor in eminent domain valuation without allowing it to be the only factor.  
When highest and best use provides a concrete and accurate representation of 
both conflicting interests, we remain true to founding philosophies of property 
rights, and allow the valuation system to consider both of these goals more 
comprehensively. 
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